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美國學者在雜誌上發表評論文章:“中美不可能長期共存,除非顛覆中國政府,否則美國別想擊敗中國。” ​​​​




America Will Only Win When China’s Regime Fails
美國只有在中國政權失敗時才能獲勝




There are two possible outcomes of U.S.-China competition—but Washington should prepare for the more turbulent one.
美中競爭有兩種可能的結果ーー但華盛頓應該為更加動盪的結果做好準備

BY 作者 ZACK COOPER 扎克 · 庫珀, HAL BRANDS 哈爾 · 布蘭茲 | MARCH 11, 2021, 3:07 AM 11,2021,3:07 AM


Filipinos burn a mock Chinese flag with a collage of the faces of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and Chinese President Xi Jinping during an anti-China protest outside the Chinese Embassy in Makati, Philippines, on July 12, 2019. 2019年7月12日,在馬卡蒂的中國大使館外舉行的反華抗議活動中,菲律賓人燒毀了一面仿制的中國國旗,上面拼貼着菲律賓總統羅德里戈 · 杜特地和中國國家主席習近平的面孔EZRA ACAYAN/GETTY IMAGES EZRA ACAYAN/蓋蒂圖片社

Competition between the United States and China has begun, but how will it end? There is a bipartisan consensus that Sino-American relations will be defined primarily by rivalry across multiple regions and dimensions of statecraft for years to come. Yet there is little clarity on what U.S. leaders hope will happen after that. Washington has accepted the reality of competition without identifying a theory of victory. There is no lack of suggestions, but U.S. leaders have yet to articulate how this competition will lead to something other than unending tension and danger.
美國和中國之間的競爭已經開始,但它將如何結束?兩黨一致認為,未來幾年,中美關係的定義將主要是多個地區和治國之道的競爭。然而,對于美國領導人希望之后會發生什么,目前尚不清楚。華盛頓已經接受了競爭的現實,卻沒有確定勝利的理論。雖然不乏建議,但美國領導人尚未明確表示,這場競爭將如何導致除了無休止的緊張和危險之外的其他結果。




Killing Moderate Pakistan, One Advocate for Tolerance at a…Killing Moderate Pakistan, One Advocate for Tolerance at a…Two gruesome anniversaries show that the country’s democratic founding ideals are dead—with potentially devastating…兩個令人毛骨悚然的周年紀念日表明,這個國家的民主建國理想已經死亡——具有潛在的毀滅性... ..



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At several points, the Trump administration argued that rivalry with China was caused by the nature of the Communist Party, implying that the rivalry would last as long as the regime did. Yet the administration also insisted, confusingly, that its approach was not based “on an attempt to change the PRC’s domestic governance model.” Similarly, the Biden administration has accepted strategic competition with China—“extreme competition,” as the president phrased it—without publicly clarifying how that competition might ultimately be resolved.
特朗普政府在幾個方面辯稱,與中國的競爭是由共產黨的性質造成的,這意味着這種競爭會像共產黨政權一樣持續下去。然而,令人困惑的是,奧巴馬政府還堅稱,它的做法並非基于“試圖改變中國國內治理模式”同樣,拜登政府也接受了與中國的戰略競爭——用奧巴馬總統的話說,就是“極端競爭”——但沒有公開說明這種競爭最終會如何解決。

There are many possible outcomes to the Sino-American competition, from the United States ceding a sphere of influence to China, to mutual accommodation, to Chinese collapse, to a devastating global conflict. Yet if the goal of competition is to secure a better peace by means short of war, then the pivotal question becomes whether the United States can achieve this outcome by changing the minds of Chinese leaders—convincing them that expansion and aggrandizement is futile—or whether it will require the decline of Chinese power or the downfall of the Chinese Communist Party.
中美之間的競爭有很多可能的結果,從美國向中國讓出勢力範圍,到相互遷就,到中國崩潰,再到毀滅性的全球衝突。然而,如果競爭的目標是通過戰爭以外的手段獲得更好的和平,那么關鍵的問題就變成了美國能否通過改變中國領導人的想法來實現這一結果ーー說服他們相信擴張和擴張是徒勞的ーー或者它是否需要中國實力的衰落或中國共產黨的垮台。

In short, can Sino-American tensions lead to competitive coexistence? Or must this rivalry culminate in regime failure via the weakening or political evolution of the United States’ challenger? U.S. officials should certainly hope for the first outcome, but they should probably prepare for the second.
簡而言之,中美緊張關係能否導致競爭性共存?或者,這種對抗必須通過美國挑戰者的削弱或政治演變最終導致政權失敗嗎?美國官員當然應該期待第一個結果,但他們可能應該為第二個結果做好準備。

Advocates of competitive coexistence believe the United States can eventually change the minds of Chinese leaders, convincing them not to seek regional preeminence and upset the U.S.-led international order in Asia and beyond. The hope is that if the United States demonstrates, over a period of years, that it can maintain a favorable balance of power in the Western Pacific, preserve its key economic and technological advantages, and rally overlapping state coalitions to uphold key rules and norms, then Beijing might adopt less bellicose (and self-defeating) policies.
競爭共存的倡導者認為,美國最終可以改變中國領導人的想法,說服他們不要尋求地區優勢,並打亂美國主導的亞洲及其他地區的國際秩序。人們希望,如果美國能夠在一段時間內證明,它能夠在西太平洋地區維持有利的力量平衡,保持其關鍵的經濟和技術優勢,並團結重疊的國家聯盟來維護關鍵的規則和準則,那么北京可能會採取不那么好戰(和自我挫敗)的政策。

In either case, U.S.-China relations would not necessarily become harmonious; there would still be elements of military, geopolitical, economic, technological, and diplomatic competition. But Beijing would reduce the sharpness of its challenge, particularly on issues—such as Taiwan and the U.S. alliance structure in East Asia—where U.S. vital interests are at stake. The goal, whether codified by a diplomatic settlement or simply arrived at implicitly, would be a more stable relationship where the danger of conflict is reduced, the United States’ key strategic interests are preserved, and areas of potential cooperation gradually expand.
無論哪種情況,美中關係都不一定會和諧; 仍然會有軍事、地緣政治、經濟、技術和外交競爭的因素。但北京會降低其挑戰的難度,尤其是在台灣和美國在東亞的聯盟結構等問題上,這些問題關係到美國的切身利益。無論是通過外交解決方案編纂而成,還是只是默默達成,目標都是建立一種更穩定的關係,減少衝突的危險,保護美國的關鍵戰略利益,並逐步擴大潛在的合作領域。



This competitive coexistence theory updates, but does not discard, the logic of U.S. policy toward China in the post-Cold War era. It holds that Washington can still successfully shape Beijing’s behavior through the right mix of incentives, although it will have to rely more on collective pressure and less on positive inducements. It maintains the hope that the Chinese Communist Party may mellow over time: Even if Chinese President Xi Jinping has chosen confrontation, perhaps his successors will be more moderate. This approach thus relies on effective Sino-American diplomacy, not just to avoid war and identify possibilities for near-term cooperation but also to explore the possibility of a longer-term way of life.
這種競爭共存理論更新而非拋棄了后冷戰時期美國對華政策的邏輯。它認為,華盛頓仍然可以通過正確的激勵組合成功地塑造北京的行為,儘管它將不得不更多地依賴于集體壓力,而不是積極的誘因。它仍然希望中國共產黨會隨着時間的推移變得温和: 即使中國國家主席習近平選擇了對抗,也許他的繼任者會更加温和。因此,這種做法依賴于有效的中美外交,不僅是為了避免戰爭和確定近期合作的可能性,而且也是為了探索長期生活方式的可能性。

This approach is attractive because it offers the possibility of strategic success without the downfall of one of the protagonists. Yet it invites a series of questions. Does the fact that Beijing has become so avowedly assertive, not just regionally but globally, indicate that any softening of China’s policies may be many years in the future? Indeed, if Xi holds onto power as long as Chairman Mao Zedong did—until the age of 82—then a post-Xi leadership would not emerge until 2035 at the earliest. In addition, how would the United States know if the Chinese Communist Party made a strategic decision to lower its geopolitical sights as opposed to a tactical decision to temporarily reduce tensions in hopes of splitting its opponents? After all, this is often what Soviet leaders had in mind when they spoke of “peaceful coexistence” and sought to reduce tensions in the 1950s and after. The Chinese Communist Party may no longer be Marxist, but it hails from the same Leninist tradition that views strategic deception, obfuscation of intentions, and other artifices as essential tools of geopolitical rivalry.
這種辦法之所以有吸引力,是因為它提供了戰略成功的可能性,而不會導致其中一方倒台。然而,這引發了一系列問題。不僅在地區層面,而且在全球層面,北京都變得如此自信,這是否意味着,中國政策的任何軟化都可能需要多年時間?事實上,如果習掌權的時間和毛澤東一樣長---- 直到82歲---- 那么后習時代的領導人最早也要到2035年才會出現。此外,美國如何知道中國共產黨是否做出了降低地緣政治視野的戰略決定,而不是為了分裂對手而暫時緩和緊張局勢的戰術決定?畢竟,這往往是蘇聯領導人所想的,當他們談到“和平共處”,並尋求緩和緊張局勢在20世紀50年代及其后。中國共產黨可能不再是馬克思主義者,但它來自同樣的列寧主義傳統,認為戰略欺騙、意圖混淆和其他詭計是地緣政治競爭的必要工具。

Then there is the biggest problem with this approach: It may not reflect the reality of the struggle in which the United States is engaged. Competitive coexistence holds that the rivalry between the United States and China is severe but not immutable. In other words, a powerful Communist Party-led China can eventually be reconciled to a world order where the United States, its allies and partners, and its democratic values remain predominant. Yet what if that belief is illusory because the rivalry is actually more fundamental? What if the Chinese Communist Party desires a more thoroughgoing revision of the international system, in part because it perceives a system led by a democratic superpower and premised on the superiority of democratic values as an existential threat to its own survival?
這種方法還有一個最大的問題: 它可能不能反映美國正在進行的鬥爭的現實。競爭共存論認為,中美之間的競爭是嚴峻的,但不是一成不變的。換句話說,一個強大的共產黨領導的中國最終可以接受一個世界秩序,在這個秩序中,美國及其盟友和夥伴,以及它的民主價值觀仍然占據主導地位。然而,如果這種信念是虛幻的,因為競爭實際上更為根本呢?如果中國共產黨希望對國際體系進行更徹底的改革,部分原因是它認為這個體系由一個民主超級大國領導,並以民主價值的優越性為前提,是對其自身生存的一種生存威脅,那會怎么樣?






China’s Military Is Outmatched 中國的軍事實力被超越
As the Quad alliance prepares to meet, leaders should take an honest look at the challenges China’s military presents.
在四方聯盟準備會晤之際,各國領導人應該誠實地審視中國軍事面臨的挑戰。

CHINA BRIEF (美國)《中國簡報》 | JAMES PALMER 詹姆斯 · 帕默Although Sino-American tensions have peaked under Xi, Rush Doshi, director of the Brookings China Strategy Initiative, has shown that those tensions reflect something deeper than the outsized ambitions of a single statesman. Leading Chinese officials have publicly affirmed the party’s view that the United States has always been committed to undermining the Communist regime. Nadège Rolland, a senior fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research, suggests the party will have tremendous difficulty ever reconciling itself to an international order whose liberal principles conflict directly with the government’s illiberal domestic rule. Even in the early 1990s, at the dawn of post-Cold War engagement policy, Chinese military officials argued that the contrast between U.S. and Chinese systems of government made it “impossible to fundamentally improve Sino-U.S. relations.” Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Beijing pursued a strategy of subtly “blunting” U.S. power, setting the conditions for China’s move “closer to the center of the world stage,” as Xi has put it.
儘管中美緊張關係在習任內已經達到了頂峰,但布魯金斯學會中國戰略倡議(Brookings China Strategy Initiative)主任拉什 · 多希(Rush Doshi)已經表明,這些緊張關係反映出的不僅僅是一位政治家的雄心壯志。中國的主要官員已經公開確認了黨的觀點,即美國一直致力于推翻共產黨政權。美國國家亞洲研究局(National Bureau of Asian Research)高級研究員納德日•羅蘭(Nadège Rolland)表示,中共很難讓自己與國際秩序達成和解,因為國際秩序的自由主義原則與政府狹隘的國內統治直接衝突。甚至在20世紀90年代初,即冷戰后接觸政策剛剛出台之時,中國軍方官員就認為,美國和中國政府體制之間的對比,使得“不可能從根本上改善中美關係”在整個20世紀90年代和21世紀頭十年,北京都在追求一種微妙地“削弱”美國實力的戰略,為中國“走近世界舞台的中心”創造條件,正如習所說。

Soothing win-win rhetoric aside, the Chinese Communist Party is governed by a fundamentally zero-sum mindset. This bodes ill for the prospect of a long-term strategic accommodation. Moreover, the party’s increasingly coercive behavior over the last few years, its horrifying crimes against its Uyghur population, and its utterly irresponsible conduct at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate how fundamentally the regime’s concept of self-interest diverges from anything acceptable to the United States and other liberal democracies. In short, the United States needs to reckon with the possibility that acute Sino-American antagonism will persist so long as a powerful China is governed by the Chinese Communist Party.
撇開寬慰的雙贏論調不談,中國共產黨的執政思路基本上是零和思維。這預示着長期戰略性和解的前景不妙。此外,黨在過去幾年裡越來越強制性的行為,它對其維吾爾族人民的駭人聽聞的罪行,以及它在2019冠狀病毒疾病流行病爆發之初完全不負責任的行為,表明這個政權的自身利益概念從根本上與美國和其他自由民主國家可以接受的任何東西背道而馳。簡而言之,美國需要考慮這樣一種可能性,即只要一個強大的中國由中國共產黨統治,中美之間的緊張對抗就會持續下去。

If this is the case, then it may be naive to think that even a long period of vigorous competition by the United States would bring about a mellowing of the Chinese Communist Party. Instead, rivalry could persist in a fairly intense form until the party loses its ability to prosecute it. This could come about due to either a decline in Chinese power or a fundamental change in the nature of the ruling regime. In this scenario, the United States’ theory of victory begins to look similar to that offered by containment during the Cold War, when historian George Kennan argued that the Soviets “looked forward to a duel of infinite duration” and the United States must prepare accordingly. In this case, competition would not be a relatively short bridge to a more stable, less hostile relationship but rather a longer bridge to the collapse of China’s power or transformation of its government.
如果是這樣的話,那么認為即使是美國長期的激烈競爭也會帶來中國共產黨的成熟就可能是天真的了。相反,競爭可能會以一種相當激烈的形式持續下去,直到該黨失去起訴它的能力。這可能是由于中國實力的下降或者統治體制性質的根本性改變。在這種情況下,美國的勝利理論開始類似于冷戰時期的遏制政策。當時,歷史學家喬治 · 凱南(George Kennan)認為,蘇聯“期待着一場持續時間無限的決鬥”,美國必須做好相應的準備。在這種情況下,競爭不會成為通往更穩定、更友好關係的相對短暫的橋樑,而是通往中國權力崩潰或政府轉型的更長的橋樑。



According to this regime-failure theory, what will ultimately end the Sino-American competition is the accumulated effect of the profound internal stresses China faces combined with consistent external resistance. If the United States and its allies and partners are successful in checking China’s aggrandizement, then the combination of slowing economic growth, a growing debt bubble, a slow-motion demographic catastrophe, and other internal domestic stresses could lead to a marked decline in China’s ability to challenge the international order. In such a world, Beijing’s hostility toward Washington could become less strategically problematic, even if hostility persists.
根據這一制度失靈理論,最終結束中美競爭的是中國面臨的深層次內部壓力與一貫的外部阻力的累積效應。如果美國及其盟友和夥伴成功地遏制了中國的擴張,那么經濟增長放緩、債務泡沫不斷膨脹、人口結構災難緩慢發展,以及其他國內壓力,可能會導致中國挑戰國際秩序的能力明顯下降。在這樣一個世界裡,即使敵意依然存在,北京對華盛頓的敵意可能會變得不那么具有戰略意義。

Alternatively, the same pressures could ultimately lead to an evolution in Chinese governance, either toward democracy or simply a less aggressive form of autocracy. In either case, the United States’ primary task would be to hold the line geopolitically for as long as it takes these internal processes to unfold. The United States might also seek to marginally accelerate the party’s downfall by showcasing its drawbacks or limiting access to certain key technologies, which would impede economic growth and complicate the consolidation of a high-tech Chinese security state.
或者,同樣的壓力可能最終導致中國政府的演變,或者走向民主,或者只是一種不那么咄咄逼人的專制形式。無論哪種情況,美國的首要任務都將是在地緣政治上保持領先地位,直到這些內部進程展開為止。美國也可能試圖通過展示黨的缺點或限制某些關鍵技術的使用,來略微加速黨的垮台,這將阻礙經濟增長,並使中國這個高科技安全國家的鞏固工作複雜化。

These are grim prescriptions, precisely because the regime-failure scenario echoes an experience—the Cold War—that almost no one wants to relive. The regime-failure theory also raises some serious questions. A Chinese Communist Party that fears its power or control is slipping could become more aggressive in the near term. The concerted use of offensive measures to increase the strains on that regime could also increase tensions and dangers in the bilateral relationship. And critically, it is unclear whether the combination of external resistance and pressure would hasten the decay of the Chinese Communist Party rather than inadvertently helping it maintain control by stoking Chinese nationalism.
這些都是嚴酷的處方,恰恰是因為政權倒台的情景與冷戰的經歷相呼應,幾乎沒有人願意重温這種經歷。政權失靈理論也提出了一些嚴重的問題。中國共產黨擔心自己的權力或控制力正在下滑,短期內可能會變得更加咄咄逼人。協調一致地使用進攻性措施來加劇該制度的緊張局勢也可能增加雙邊關係的緊張和危險。至關重要的是,外部阻力和壓力的結合是否會加速中國共產黨的衰落,而不是通過煽動中國的民族主義,無意中幫助它保持控制,目前尚不清楚。

That said, this approach is not as radical as it might sound. It need not involve actively promoting regime change any more than the United States’ Cold War strategy actively sought to overthrow the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It simply involves accepting that the nature of the Chinese Communist Party imposes severe limitations on how much the relationship can improve so long as the party retains power. This approach also does not require forswearing diplomacy any more than the Cold War precluded cooperation on arms control, smallpox eradication, or the tacit acceptance of stabilizing mechanisms. But this view holds that diplomacy cannot fundamentally resolve the competition, absent deeper changes within China.
也就是說,這種方法並不像聽起來那么激進。它不需要涉及積極推動政權更迭,正如美國的冷戰戰略積極尋求推翻蘇聯共產黨一樣。它僅僅包括接受這樣一個事實: 只要中國共產黨繼續掌權,兩國關係的改善程度就會受到其性質的嚴格限制。這種方法也不需要放棄外交手段,正如冷戰排除了在軍備控制、根除天花或默認穩定機制方面的合作一樣。但這種觀點認為,如果中國內部缺乏更深層次的變革,外交不能從根本上解決競爭。

Why should the United States spend any time thinking about a long-term theory of victory in a competition that is just getting underway? Given how poorly that competition is going in certain key areas, it may be tempting to focus on figuring out how to handle China in the here and now while deferring intellectual debates on the distant future. Perhaps the United States should just go about the business of managing the problem rather than trying to determine how to solve it.
為什么美國要花時間思考一個長期的勝利理論,在一個剛剛開始的競爭中?考慮到在某些關鍵領域的競爭是多么的糟糕,人們可能會忍不住關注如何在此時此地應對中國,同時推遲關于遙遠未來的學術辯論。也許美國應該只管處理這個問題,而不是試圖決定如何解決它。

But not identifying a desired equilibrium for U.S.-China competition would be a mistake. Strategy involves determining how actions taken today will contribute to the realization of more distant objectives. Different theories of victory might produce different conceptions of the role that bilateral diplomacy and offensive pressure should play in U.S. statecraft. Moreover, if we don’t know the outcome we desire, how can we measure the effectiveness of our policy approaches? And if rivalry with China is indeed the fundamental challenge for U.S. strategy today, then how long will U.S. citizens tolerate costly actions without knowing their ultimate objective?
但是,如果不能為中美之間的競爭找到一個理想的平衡點,那將是一個錯誤。戰略涉及確定今天採取的行動將如何有助于實現更為遙遠的目標。不同的勝利理論可能會對雙邊外交和進攻性壓力在美國治國方略中的作用產生不同的概念。此外,如果我們不知道我們想要的結果,我們如何衡量我們的政策方法的有效性?如果與中國的競爭確實是當今美國戰略的根本挑戰,那么美國公民在不知道其最終目標的情況下還能容忍代價高昂的行動多久呢?

It is difficult to say with certainty which theory of victory is analytically superior, but the balance of evidence supports the more pessimistic theory discussed here—that competition should be seen as a bridge to long-term changes in Chinese power or in the way China is governed. That’s a relatively dark view of where Sino-American competition may be heading. Yet if the rivalry is as fundamental as Chinese Communist Party leaders seem to think and if Chinese ambitions are as extensive as a growing number of Sinologists have documented, then that view may also be the most realistic.
很難肯定地說哪一種勝利理論在分析上更勝一籌,但證據的平衡支持本文討論的更為悲觀的理論,即競爭應被視為通向中國實力或中國治理方式長期變化的橋樑。對于中美競爭的走向,這是一種相對黑暗的看法。然而,如果這種競爭如中國共產黨領導人所認為的那樣根本,如果中國的雄心如越來越多的漢學家所記錄的那樣廣泛,那么這種觀點可能也是最為現實的。

This conclusion leads, however, to a final problem: At the moment, the theory of victory that holds together analytically may not be the theory of victory that best holds the counter-China coalition together diplomatically. A multilateral collective pressure strategy is necessary to demonstrate patience and firmness to Beijing. This requires assembling distinct but overlapping coalitions to balance Beijing’s power militarily, economically, technologically, and ideologically.
然而,這一結論引出了一個最后的問題: 目前,分析性地維繫在一起的勝利理論,可能不是在外交上最能維繫反華聯盟的勝利理論。要向中國政府表現出耐心和堅定,就必須採取多邊集體施壓戰略。這需要聚集不同但重疊的聯盟來平衡北京的軍事、經濟、技術和意識形態。

So far, the task of rallying these coalitions has been complicated by the fact that many U.S. allies and partners in Asia, Europe, and elsewhere are still seeking to avoid a zero-sum choice between Washington and Beijing. Few of these countries would welcome a U.S. strategy explicitly predicated on regime failure; in fact, just talking about this approach in public could make it harder to rally the coalitions needed to meet China’s challenge. It is not surprising, then, that there has remained so much ambiguity in U.S. assessments of where the rivalry is headed because the requirements of analytical clarity seem at odds—for now, at least—with the requirements of diplomatic efficacy.
迄今為止,由于美國在亞洲、歐洲和其他地區的許多盟友和夥伴仍在尋求避免在華盛頓和北京之間做出零和選擇,團結這些聯盟的任務變得更加複雜。這些國家中很少有國家會歡迎美國明確預測政權失敗的戰略; 事實上,僅僅公開談論這種方法就會使得聯合起來應對中國的挑戰變得更加困難。因此,美國對于這場競爭的走向仍然存在如此多的模稜兩可之處就不足為奇了,因為分析清晰度的要求似乎與外交效力的要求不符(至少目前如此)。

There is no easy solution to this conundrum. Eventually, the U.S. government must be candid about its China strategy: There is no way to rally the domestic commitment and resources necessary to succeed if U.S. officials soft-pedal the underlying problem. Democracies cannot, and should not, maintain one strategic agenda in private and a second one for public and international consumption. In the near term, there may be good reasons to highlight the practical aspects of building the coalitions needed to counter China while downplaying the more sensitive question of how this might all end. But in the longer term, it is hard to see how the United States can win the defining rivalry of this century without being clear about what it is trying to achieve.
這個難題沒有簡單的解決辦法。最終,美國政府必須坦率地對待它的中國戰略: 如果美國官員對根本問題視而不見,就沒有辦法集中必要的國內承諾和資源來取得成功。民主國家不能、也不應該在私下維持一個戰略議程,而在公共和國際層面維持第二個戰略議程。在短期內,也許有充分的理由強調建立對抗中國所需的聯盟的實際方面,同時淡化這一切將如何結束這一更為敏感的問題。但從長遠來看,如果美國不清楚自己試圖實現的目標,就很難看到它如何能夠贏得本世紀的決定性競爭。



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過去無數美國總統
也因利益衝突
被美國利益集團刺殺

因利益去顛覆中國政府
絕對是美國利益集團嘅選項



以子之矛、攻子之盾,如何?
尾角喺二戰後構建咗聯合國及屬下組織,並建立一套規則來實現尾角主導嘅世界。蘇聯則用對抗去建立另一個規則並最終喺與尾角鬪爭中失敗。但中國系加入咗尾角主導規則下參與遊戲的,咁先導致侵政府不斷“退群”,讓出咗尾角“主導聯合國”同世界各種組織嘅“領導地位”,包括WTO、WHO等。
如果真想實現“尾角回來了”的夢想,扭轉而家嘅頹勢。“尾角優先”就必須放棄。但拜登政府敢拋棄侵嘅“遺産”咩?曅竟侵侵還在虎視眈眈。拜登政府埶政上首鼠兩端,雖然手段上更加陰濕,但“盟友”不易回來了。中國乘虛而入嘅機會比以往大咗,呢樣嘢尾角睇唔睇到?



這個思維,不只是對中國的立場吧,美國要做霸主沒什麼國家能好好過的,有點能耐彈大的都被美國引入戰火,肯俯首稱臣的同盟國領導有點異心,就被各種醜聞迫下台,現今世界唯有中國能避開美國的魔爪


他帶著有色眼鏡,大美國白人主義信徒,及天主教神父,認為美國就是天主,世人要遵守美國定下嘅規條,及向美國白人稱臣,否則就係異見者,需要消滅。


一山不能藏二虎,一開波就核彈見真章!


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美國就是霸權心態,沒什麼意外的


美國奉行是叢林主義, 一山不能藏二虎的心態, 那些當年駡習主席不應加快軍事發展的, 應要自盡, 當年日本都冇發展軍事只發展經濟都一樣被美國打殘.




所以中國應更要加快軍事發展, 更要壯大同盟, 才是生存之道, 放棄那各家自掃門前雪的蠢諗法吧!!!! 不智的!!!

[ 本帖最後由 cwilson1 於 2021-3-16 08:12 PM 編輯 ]



引用:
原帖由 starr 於 2021-3-16 08:57 AM 發表
美國就是霸權心態,沒什麼意外的
暫時中國只有能與美國同歸於盡的能力, 但未能制霸, 打美國制服, 所以中國要加多幾倍努力, 強大下去, 同美國仲有明顯差距是事實.

_



引用:
原帖由 笑看流浪英犬 於 2021-3-16 05:23 AM 發表
美國學者在雜誌上發表評論文章:“中美不可能長期共存,除非顛覆中國政府,否則美國別想擊敗中國。” ​​​​

https://wx2.sinaimg.cn/mw690/6232a59aly1gokjgvgo26j20ny0843z4.jpg
即係中國只要做好自己本份,為人民服務.以民本為國策..

中國必定戰勝美國...

僭台詞...
美國想在中國攪民主,只係為左顛覆中國政府..



引用:
原帖由 cwilson1 於 2021-3-16 09:03 AM 發表
美國奉行是叢生主義, 一山不能藏二虎的心態, 那些當年駡習主席不應加快軍事發展的, 應要自盡, 當年日本都冇發展軍事只發展經濟都一樣被美國打殘.




所以中國應更要加快軍事發展, 更要壯大同盟, 才是生存之道, 放棄那各家自掃門前雪的蠢諗法吧!!!! 不智的!!!
毛主席勁,寧要核子不要褲子,從此中國安享太平。
鄧小平勁,64打尾角走狗,一爐永溢專心發展。
習大大勁,國安法收復第二反華基地……香港。

下一步,就是打倒第一反華基地……呆灣。



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天下大勢,合久必分,
這種情況古今中外皆如是,是人性所致,和文化制度等等外在因素無關。
新中國才70歲,正處于上升期,朝氣蓬勃,只會越來越好,越來越強大。
而美國已經240歲了,僵化保守,自大而愚昧,越來越像一個老年痴呆。
美國若是優雅的老去,尚可安享晚年,
但若不服老,勉力支撐霸權,不免加速損耗,加快死亡。
不過,美國是個沒自信的暴發戶,暴發戶最害怕的就是示弱而被人瞧不起。
所以,美國發瘋的幾率是很大的。



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