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全身佈滿裸露釘口位,核突非常,工藝居然同cheap cheap 的廢柴蟲同一檔次,果然魔鬼都在細節

奸20







廢柴蟲FC-1




[ 本帖最後由 鏡花如水月 於 2017-1-17 04:55 PM 編輯 ]



對比下F35的精湛工藝,殲20係咪要溫窿捐






[ 本帖最後由 鏡花如水月 於 2017-1-17 05:42 PM 編輯 ]



F35連様都冇得賣就死得啦!


引用:
原帖由 tinghimw 於 2017-1-17 05:57 PM 發表
F35連様都冇得賣就死得啦!
你認為只是顏值問題



[隱藏]
軍版真的不少智將孩童,
第一,中國成立左多少年,尾腳又成立左多少年,老尾軍事科技較優是應該的,
第二,除中美外,還有誰造了老隱戰機?
第三,用老尾的頂級科技去同港童所謂的二流會爆炸的國家去比,原來老尾只能二流比較,實在醜怪得很.

第四,肥電內涵唔見得好幾多,果然魔鬼都在細節.
Mr. President, Cancel the F-35
The failed F-35 fighter-jet program can’t be fixed — it’s time to turn the page. Our incoming president’s willingness to boldly challenge the status quo is arguably the main reason he was elected. And no defense project is more representative of a disastrous status quo than the 20-year-old Joint Strike Fighter program — the F-35. The F-35 program showcases all that is wrong about our military’s vendor-dominated, crony-capitalist procurement system. Unless dealt with decisively, its massive cost and its lack of capability will have a dramatically negative impact on our military’s effectiveness for decades to come.
Therefore, President-elect Trump’s willingness to publicly call out this $1.5 trillion program is good news. However, getting involved in negotiating a better price on incomplete, crippled fighters will not save taxpayers any money in the long run — because the prices being negotiated between Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon are prices designed to fool the public about the F-35’s true costs. Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon both know that any “discount” or price reduction negotiated in public will quickly be made up on the back-end, where a plethora of upgrades, airframe life-extension programs, and uber-expensive spare-parts purchases over the life of the program will easily generate over $200 million for each plane delivered. Consequently, if Trump expends presidential prestige to save a few percent off the top, it won’t solve the underlying problem. Instead, he will only validate a failed program that is a big part of the swamp he is eager to drain as part of his plan to restore our depleted military.
In place of counter-productive price negotiations, within hours of taking office President Donald Trump could use the extraordinary influence of @realDonaldTrump to tweet 127 power-packed characters: “20 years and the F-35 is still not working. Program a mess. Plane a mess. Time to stop buying F-35s! New, better planes needed!” More than any other single action, this tweet would signal that a new sheriff is in town — a sheriff committed to taking on the entrenched special interests that have corrupted the Pentagon.
TWENTY YEARS OF FAILURE
Just as Donald Trump turned out to be 100 percent correct about the bloated, $4 billion Air Force One program, he would be justified in calling foul on Marine Corps and Air Force claims that their F-35s have achieved Initial Operating Capability (IOC). Contrary to recent statements made by the executive officer of the F-35 program, Lieutenant General Chris Bogdan, the F-35 is not back on track. It’s time to face the facts: Because of fatal mistakes made during the conceptual design process well over 20 years ago, the F-35 will forever be crippled by intractable weight and heat issues that ensure that the program will never deliver a reliable, cost-effective fighter.
Further evidence of this was revealed on Wednesday, when Inside Defense exposed the fact that the Navy’s F-35C model has design defects that can cause pilots to suffer disorientation and severe pain when undergoing carrier catapult launches. As it stands, Navy pilots have determined the F-35C is not “operationally suitable” for carrier launches. New design changes to the F-35C will be required that could take years — and even our carriers may need to be modified to fix the problem. This issue has been known about for years, but until now it has been concealed from the public. So, instead of an on-track program, what we have is a pattern of deceptive statements and actions designed to create the illusion that the F-35 program is on track. The goal of this deception is to provide the political cover necessary to allow the F-35’s supporters in Congress to continue to fund the purchase of hundreds of incomplete, combat-incapable planes — each of which will require many years and many tens of millions of dollars of structural repairs, structural rework, systems-stability and functionality fixes, engine modifications and retrofits, and more. And that is just to get the planes to where they should have been when we took initial delivery. Never before have we seen a warplane granted so many waivers and reductions in key performance standards. Never before have we taken delivery of so many planes so far from being complete and so far from being ready for combat.


[ 本帖最後由 KZRTO 於 2017-1-17 06:05 PM 編輯 ]



越來越多磚家


F-35C 搞掂彈射時劇震搖晃未!



It should be unacceptable to ask American pilots to fly these fighters.
The F-35’s severe, ongoing problems with weight have resulted in indefensible decisions affecting plane safety, reliability, and durability — the most egregious example being the removal of hundreds of pounds of equipment designed to keep pilots from dying in fiery explosions. Some of the safety equipment removed includes the fuel tank’s ballistic liner, critical fueldraulic fuses, the flammable coolant shut-off valve, and the dry bay fire-extinguishing unit. The unprecedented and pervasive presence of flammable hydraulic fluid, flammable coolants, and fuel throughout the plane makes the F-35 a flying tinderbox. But without these risky weight-reduction measures, the F-35 will not be able to meet even its bare-minimum contractually mandated range goals. It should be unacceptable to ask American pilots to fly these fighters.
Other bad design decisions executed in the name of saving weight have focused on reducing the airframe’s weight. For example, load-bearing structural bulkheads originally supposed to be made from fatigue-resistant titanium were swapped out with fatigue-prone aluminum bulkheads. Now, we have aluminum bulkheads suffering stress-induced fatigue cracks that will require heavier bulkheads in future F-35s and weighty retrofit kits for those that have already been built. Unfortunately, cracked bulkheads are not the only casualty of the weight pogrom. The Department of Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E), which answers to the secretary of defense, has issued reports that are full of descriptions of cracks in engine parts, failed turbine blisks, cracks in the floor, root-rib cracks, and the like. In 2004, the F-35’s F135 engine was also subjected to an extreme weight-reduction program. Not coincidentally, according to an April 2015 Government Accountability Office report, it has very poor reliability — “less than half of where it should be.”
THE PENTAGON’S SUGAR-COATED ASSESSMENTS
Complementing the extreme, unsustainable weight-reduction efforts have been a raft of deceptive statements designed to fool the public as to the true state of the program. The most blatantly deceptive statements are the declarations by the Marine Corps and Air Force that their variants — the F-35B and the F-35A, respectively — have achieved Initial Operating Capability (IOC). In fact, they have not. Moreover, it is shocking that best-practices protocols of the rigorous operational testing followed by every major fighter program — including the F-15, the F-14, the F-18, the A-10, the F-16, the A-6, the F-4, and even the F-22 — were ignored. That Congress continues to let the service chiefs and Lockheed Martin get away with their fictional IOC declarations is another sign that congressional obeisance to Lockheed Martin has destroyed its ability to provide effective oversight of our country’s defense.
Despite the thoroughly discredited set of exercises the Marines tried to pass off as “operational testing” in May 2015, no service has been so foolish as to attempt to undertake the standard Initial Operational Testing & Evaluation (IOT&E). In fact, the services accidentally forgot to order the equipment that would allow them to even attempt the IOT&E. They understand that going through the IOT&E could kill the program. Instead, the plan appears to be to continue to avoid IOT&E like the plague for as long as possible, while continuing to buy as many F-35s as possible.
America’s new fighters will actually have to be protected in combat.
Further evidence of a what a sham the Air Force and Marine Corps IOC declarations are is revealed in a DOT&E memo. In it, we find that on the battlefield F-35s are not an asset. In fact, America’s new fighters will actually have to be protected in combat. Because of numerous performance deficiencies and limited weapons capacity, the so-called operationally capable F-35 will need support to locate and avoid threats, acquire targets, and engage enemy aircraft. Unresolved deficiencies in sensor fusion, electronic warfare, and weapons employment continue to result in ambiguous threat displays, limited ability to effectively respond to threats, and, in some cases, a requirement for off-board sources to provide accurate coordinates for precision attack. In short, the F-35 — a flying tinderbox — will need to be nursemaided by other aircraft that are actually combat capable. An August 9, 2016, DOT&E memo put the nail in the coffin with this damning statement: “In fact, the [F-35] program is actually not on a path toward success, but instead is on a path toward failing to deliver the full Block 3F capabilities [i.e., full combat capabilities].” This statement distills to just a few words what independent airpower analysts and all the DOT&E reports have been trying to tell us in gory detail — the F-35 is a failing program and the IOC being touted by the Air Force and Marines is nothing more than PR puffery designed to please Congress and the big defense contractors, the future employers of a whole lot of generals and admirals. A Navy F-35C during testing aboard USS George Washington, August 2016. (Photo: US Navy)
A PLANE SO ADVANCED, IT’S OBSOLETE After two decades, the F-35 absolutely, positively has not achieved Initial Operating Capability. By contrast, both the F-15 and the F-16 achieved IOC in eight years or less — with full production following quickly. But falsely declaring IOC is only the tip of the iceberg of what Lockheed Martin and its supporters in the military have done to prop up a program that by any reasonable measure is already a failure. Indeed, it has become standard operating procedure for the F-35’s flaws and problems to be kicked down the road to be fixed in the future. In order to protect the F-35 from cancellation, the Pentagon has lowered key performance requirements and helped Lockheed cheat so that it could continue the charade that the F-35 will actually meet its bare-minimum threshold ranges. And embarrassing, inexcusable design mistakes continue, such as the F-35B not being able to carry the number of bombs it was supposed to. After two decades, the F-35 absolutely, positively has not achieved Initial Operating Capability. Because the Joint Strike Fighter’s development has been going on for over 20 years, much of its shiny new tech that looked so neat two decades ago is now old tech. One victim of old age is the Distributed Aperture System — the hard-wired design of which means that the F-35 is stuck with older infrared sensors with vastly inferior resolution to what is available today. Likewise, the F-35’s Electro-Optical Targeting Sensor is already obsolete and is ten years behind those being used by our F-16s and A-10s. Upgrading it will be difficult and costly. After some 15 years of development, the F-35’s aging, increasingly unsupportable Integrated Core Processor computer system needed upgrading. Because of schedule pressures and the imperative to maintain the illusion of progress, the decision was made to port 20 million lines of buggy, immature code to the new architecture and then use that code as the base for coding new significant functionality. This resulted in severe, ongoing problems with the F-35’s avionics, its sensor fusion, and other unresolved deficiencies. Many of these deficiencies are not scheduled to be corrected until 2021. Given all the above, how are we to interpret the announcement that a few combat-incapable, unreliable, extremely expensive to maintain F-35s are scheduled to be deployed to Europe later this year to help deter Russian aggression? Rest assured, Vladimir Putin is not impressed — and neither should we be. But even after many more years and many more billions of dollars, we still won’t have cause to be impressed. That’s because the rapid proliferation of new anti-stealth radars by peer competitors such as Russia and China will stop the F-35 from penetrating deep into peer competitors’ air space to strike at critical targets as its supporters claimed it would be able to do. To make matters worse, the published $32,000-per-flying-hour cost is a made-up number; its real cost per flying hour will likely be closer to the $62,000 of the much less complex F-22. Its truly dismal sustained-sortie-generation rate of one sortie (mission) every three or four days means that, as is the case with our F-22 pilots, F-35 pilots will only get a fraction of the 30 to 40 hours of stick-time (actual flying time) per month necessary to gain and maintain fighter-combat mastery. The chunky F-35 will find itself facing faster, more agile, longer-range fighters carrying four times as many missiles. In going up against these planes — fighters such as the Russian SU-35S — our F-35 will find itself at a deadly disadvantage, despite its stealth.
IT TAKES A PRESIDENT But enough about missiles and sorties, back to the cost question. Since most of the real costs will occur after U.S. taxpayers take delivery, the drama being played out in the media between Lockheed and the Pentagon is no more than political theater. What we really have is a briar-patch exercise: “Oh, you mean Mr. Pentagon! Please don’t force me to sell you these shiny new planes for a few percent less than we wanted!” cries Lockheed, knowing full well that each F-35 delivered will allow them to mainline taxpayer dollars for decades to come.
No individual representative or senator has the clout to lead a successful charge against the F-35.




USAF Acknowledges Expanded Risk of Neck Damage to F-35 Pilots
his article, originally published at noon ET Oct. 14, has been updated to include comment from the Joint Program Office, and an Oct. 16 Air Force statement.

WASHINGTON — Weeks after Defense News revealed that the military services had restricted lightweight pilots from flying the F-35 joint strike fighter, the US Air Force officially acknowledged an increased risk of neck damage during ejection to middleweight pilots as well.

In a news release issued Oct. 16, the Air Force confirmed a Defense News report that pilots under 136 pounds are currently barred from flying the fifth-generation aircraft, expected to be the backbone of American airpower for decades to come. It also acknowledged an "elevated level of risk" for pilots between 136 and 165 pounds.

"We expect the manufacturer to find and implement a solution," said Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James in the statement.

The Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps instated the ban after testers this summer discovered an increased risk of neck damage when pilots are ejecting from the plane. The Joint Program Office blamed the phenomenon on the jet's ejection seat, Martin-Baker's US16E.

But interviews conducted by Defense News in recent weeks indicate the added weight and bulk of the new F-35 helmet complicates the problem. It is still unclear whether the blame rests squarely with the helmet, or the seat, or somewhere in between.

The Helmet Problem

The JPO is trying to improve safety for lightweight pilots during an ejection by reducing the weight of the new helmet, built by Rockwell Collins and Elbit Systems of America, which is on its third iteration due to repeated technical problems. Rockwell Collins is now on contract to build a Generation III "Light" helmet, David Nieuwsma, company vice president of strategy and business development for government systems, told Defense News.

"All ejections from any fighter aircraft are risky and place extreme amounts of stress upon the body," JPO spokesman Joe DellaVedova told Defense News in a Wednesday email. "The safety of our pilots is paramount and the F-35 Joint Program Office, Lockheed Martin, and Martin-Baker continue to work this issue with the US Services and International partners to reach a solution as quickly as possible."

The tests this summer that revealed the problem used mannequins equipped with the new Gen III helmet, a spokesman for the Pentagon's director of operational test and evaluation confirmed to Defense News in a recent email. Testers found the ejection snapped the necks of lighter-weight test mannequins, according to a source with knowledge of the program.

The potentially fatal problem did not occur during previous tests with the slightly lighter Gen II helmets, according to the source.

Until a permanent fix is found, the US military services have grounded pilots weighing less than 136 pounds, Defense News first reported Oct. 1. The restrictions only impact pilots under this threshold because lightweight individuals generally have lower less neck strength to absorb force, DellaVedova said. The services are not placing any flying restrictions on heavier pilots, he noted.

But the risk does not disappear above 136 pounds, experts stressed. The low-speed ejection problem is worst with the lightest pilots, from 103 to 135 pounds, and gradually lessens as aircrew weight increases. F-35 pilots above that weight could still experience serious and potentially fatal injury during a low-speed ejection.

One solution is designing a lighter helmet, which will weigh about 4.67 pounds, DellaVedova said. The JPO is looking at reducing internal strapping material and removing an external visor to reduce weight and bulk. A preliminary design review on the improved helmet is scheduled for December, with full implementation planned by summer 2017.

However, DellaVedova stressed that helmet weight was not a factor in the Aug. 27 decision to ground lightweight pilots.

“That was an ejection seat issue discovered during the parachute opening phase and was not related to the differences between the Gen II and Gen III helmets,” DellaVedova said.

But the JPO may not be able to find an easy solution, one expert warned.



[隱藏]
引用:
原帖由 KZRTO 於 2017-1-17 06:22 PM 發表
USAF Acknowledges Expanded Risk of Neck Damage to F-35 Pilots
his article, originally published at noon ET Oct. 14, has been updated to include comment from the Joint Program Office, and an ...
你整咁大段英文俾個小學生睇



引用:
原帖由 鏡花如水月 於 2017-1-17 04:42 PM 發表
全身佈滿裸露釘口位,核突非常,工藝居然同cheap cheap 的廢柴蟲同一檔次,果然魔鬼都在細節

奸20
6405357
6405363
6405303
6405304
6405305


廢柴蟲FC-1

6405306
6405307
你搵架試驗機cap圖做乜?
要cap就cap服役機嘛~



再睇F-35正面嘅「砌圖」




引用:
原帖由 我係沉大師 於 2017-1-17 06:30 PM 發表



你整咁大段英文俾個小學生睇



提示: 作者被禁止或刪除 內容自動屏蔽
From ejector seats that could kill to a computer system pilots can't log into: Pentagon F-35 fighter jet report reveals massive problems still facing 'most expensive weapon in history'
Footage shows F-35 stealth jet unleashing 181 rounds in matter of seconds
The four-barrel Gatling gun is embedded in the wing to keep stealth profile
Test team hopes to launch first phase of airborne gun testing in the fall
Highly-anticipated stealth jet has been plagued by production setbacks
It has so far cost over $3.5bn, and is eight years late.
Hailed as the most expensive weapon in history, the controversial F-35 stealth fighter jet is undergoing rigorous testing at California's Edwards Air Force Base.
However, a new Pentagon report has revealed a massive list of potentially lethal bugs still facing the jet.
A December memo by Michael Gilmore, the Department of Defense's director for Operational Test and Evaluation warned of 'significant ongoing challenges' - and these have now been revealed.
The Air Force is currently scheduled to announce their version of the plane is ready to begin flying, known as 'initial operating capability,' in August or December at the latest, according to Defence One.
The Marines have already claimed their version of the plane, known as block 2B, is ready.
However, the report reveals serious problems with the computer software, including 'in fusion, electronic warfare, and weapons employment result[ing] in ambiguous threat displays, limited ability to respond to threats, and a requirement for off-board sources to provide accurate coordinates for precision attack.'
Earlier this year researchers revealed the hugely delayed and over budget project has finally fired its first shots in the air.
The F-35A Lightning II completed the first three airborne gunfire bursts from its internal Gun Airborne Unit (GAU)-22/A 25mm Gatling gun system during a California test flight on October 30th.
The F-35 also has a smart parts system to ensure everything is working within its limits, and can warn when parts need to be replaced.
However, the computerized maintenance management System, or CMMS, 'incorrectly authorizes older/inappropriate replacement parts.' the report said.
THE EJECTOR SEAT THAT COULD KILL
Pilots under 136 pounds aren't allowed to fly any F-35 variant. Pilots under 165 pounds have a 1-in-4 chance of death and 100 percent chance of serious neck injury upon ejecting, according to the testing office.
'The testing showed that the ejection seat rotates backwards after ejection.
This results in the pilot's neck becoming extended, as the head moves behind the shoulders in a 'chin up' position.
When the parachute inflates and begins to extract the pilot from the seat (with great force), a 'whiplash' action occurs.
The rotation of the seat and resulting extension of the neck are greater for lighter weight pilots,' the report states.
It also fails to detect if it's been flying too fast and  'randomly prevented user logins' into its computerised control system.
In the first live firing test, three bursts of one 30 rounds and two 60 rounds each were fired from the aircraft's four-barrel, 25-millimeter Gatling gun.
In integrating the weapon into the stealthy F 35A airframe, the gun must be kept hidden behind closed doors to reduce its radar cross section until the trigger is pulled.
'The successful aerial gun test sortie was a culmination of several years' planning, which intensified in the first half of 2015 at the Edwards F-35 Integrated Test Force (ITF) Flight Test Squadron with a team of Air Force, Lockheed Martin, Pratt & Whitney, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman personnel,' said Mike Glass, Edwards ITF flight test director.
'The results of this testing will be used in future blocks of testing, where the accuracy and mission effectiveness capabilities will be evaluated.'
The 25mm gun is embedded in the F-35A's left wing and is designed to be integrated in a way to maintain the F-35's very low observable criteria.
It will provide pilots with the ability to engage air-to-ground and air-to-air targets.
'At the end of the program's system development and demonstration phase in 2017, the F-35 will have an operational gun.  
The first phase of F-35 gun testing started in June, when initial shots were fired from the ground at the Edwards Air Force Flight Test Center's gun harmonizing range.
The gun system will be further tested with a production F-35A next year for integration with the jet's full mission systems capabilities.
The test team will demonstrate the gun's effectiveness in both air-to-air and air-to-ground employment when integrated with the next generation fighter's sensor fusion software, which will provide targeting information to the pilot through the helmet mounted display.
At the end of the program's system development and demonstration phase in 2017, the F-35 will have an operational gun.
The first phase of the gun testing began on June 9, and the amount of munitions fired has been gradually increased, until the 181 rounds were fired on August 17.
The ground tests were designed using software to replicate being in flight, using a production version of the GAU-22/A gun.
The tests, using the target practice PGU-23/U which does not explode on impact, showed the gun's ability to spin up and down correctly.
Further testing will be carried out next year, to integrate the GAU-22/A system with the jet's full avionics and mission systems capabilities.
The following stage will be to observe the qualitative effects, including muzzle flash – the visible light emitted by the blast of a firearm – the human factors, and the flying qualities.
But the production of the latest breed of stealth jet – one of the most highly anticipated advancements in military history – has had more than its fair share of problems.
Despite costing the US military more than $350billion, the jet has so far failed to live up to expectations.
The cutting-edge F-35, which is meant to be the most sophisticated jet ever, was embarrassingly outperformed by a 40-year-old F-16 jet in a dogfight in July.
The test pilot condemned the jet's performance at the time, claiming it performed so appallingly that he deemed it completely inappropriate for fighting other aircraft within visual range.
The Pentagon leapt to the defense of its new toy, insisting that the aircraft used in the test was not equipped to the same standard of its front-line aircraft, and did not have its 'stealth coating'.
But even so, the dismal result of the dogfight against an aircraft designed in the 1970s did little to restore confidence in the F-35.
He even criticised the half-million-dollar custom-made helmet, supposedly designed to give the pilot a 360-degree view outside the plane, but which he claimed made it difficult to move his head inside the cramped cockpit.



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相由心生。
殲20?細路仔一睇就覺得係壞人嘅武器,地球保衛隊一定要消滅佢!



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